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What Maisie Knew is manifestly concerned with learning and teaching. 
Maisie receives instruction from no fewer than four nurses and governesses 
in the novel, not to mention the edifying public lectures and books of 
essays gaily prescribed by Sir Claude, and rich resources of irony are 
discovered in the contrast between what Maisie doesn’t learn in the 
schoolroom and the travesty of education she absorbs from her bruising 
encounters with the sordid, helter-skelter adult world.1 No less manifestly, 
and by common critical consent, What Maisie Knew is also concerned with 
cognition or, as William James put it, ‘the function of knowing’ – in the 
words of one recent critic, the novel is ‘an exploration of what it might 
mean for a child to “know”’.2 Yet while questions of cognition or knowing 
have been a leitmotif of criticism on the novel (frequently approached 
under the banners of epistemology or phenomenology), and education as 
metaphor has been productively explored, its literal instances of learning 
and instruction have proven of less interest.3 My aim in this paper is to 
                                                 
1 Maisie’s nurses and governesses, in order of appearance, are Moddle, Miss 
Overmore, the unnamed child minder employed briefly by Beale Farange, and Mrs 
Wix. 
2 William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 (New York: Dover, 1950), 
p.271. Sally Shuttleworth, The Mind of the Child: Child Development in Literature, 
Science, and Medicine, 1840–1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.325. 
3 Christina Britzolakis writes that Maisie ‘has often been seen by critics as an 
‘experimental’ precursor of modernism at the level both of structural innovation 
and in its concern with problems of epistemology’. Christina Britzolakis, 
‘Technologies of Vision in Henry James’ What Maisie Knew’, NOVEL: A Forum 
on Fiction 34, no. 3 (2001): 370. For Paul B. Armstrong, ‘To know and how to 
know, that is the question for James the epistemological novelist’. Paul B. 
Armstrong, The Phenomenology of Henry James (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1983), p.3. Britzolakis gives a sophisticated reading of the 
‘metaphor of the city as traumatic nursery’ (p.372), engaging with Juliet Mitchell’s 
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draw attention to the theme of education in What Maisie Knew and to read 
the novel’s concern with cognition specifically in relation to the model of 
learning it entails. How one understands cognition is, after all, likely to 
influence how one approaches education, as is apparent from the 
educational applications of both modern and classical cognitive 
psychology. In what follows, I argue that one effect of the novel’s satirical 
jibes at inadequate educational ventures is to throw into relief its own 
contrastive model of learning. While many critics have understandably 
found cognition and vision in What Maisie Knew to be tightly intertwined, 
close attention to the trope of learning suggests that cognition for James 
was just as dependent on doing as on seeing. In this respect, I suggest, the 
model of learning and cognition depicted in What Maisie Knew resembles 
the approach to cognition developed by William James in The Principles of 
Psychology (1890) and in two important papers later collected in The 
Meaning of Truth: ‘On the Function of Cognition’ (1885) and ‘The 
Knowing of Things Together’ (1895).  
 
 
William James, cognition and learning 
 
Many critics have argued for a connection between Henry James’ fiction 
and William James’ pragmatism, often deriving encouragement from 
Henry’s 1907 statement, made in a letter congratulating William on his 
Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, that ‘I was lost 
in the wonder of the extent to which all my life I have (like M. Jourdain) 
unconsciously pragmatized’.4 Some commentators also posit affinities with 
                                                                                                      
classic reading of the novel as a story of aesthetic education: ‘a process of initiation 
into vision’. Juliet Mitchell, ‘What Maisie Knew: Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Girl’, in The Air of Reality: New Essays on Henry James, ed. John Goode (London: 
Methuen, 1972), p.177. 
4 Quoted in Richard A. Hocks, Henry James and Pragmatistic Thought: A Study in 
the Relationship between the Philosophy of William James and the Literary Art of 
Henry James (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974), p.151. For 
Armstrong, this connection travels by way of phenomenology: ‘A 
phenomenological approach to describing and explaining these connections 
suggests itself because of the close relation between James’ art and his brother 
William’s philosophy’. Armstrong, The Phenomenology of Henry James, p.3. See 
also Joseph J. Firebaugh, ‘The Pragmatism of Henry James’, Virginia Quarterly 
Review 27 (1951), H.B. Parkes, ‘The James Brothers’, Sewanee Review 56 (1948), 
William McMurray, ‘Pragmatic Realism in The Bostonians’, in Henry James: 
Modern Judgements, ed. Tony Tanner (Nashville: Aurora, 1970), Harvey Cormier, 
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other of William’s writings, not primarily concerned with expounding 
pragmatist doctrine, and Sämig Ludwig and Melba Cuddy-Keane have 
recently elaborated the connection between the two brothers in interesting 
ways by introducing the third term of contemporary psychology.5 I follow 
these two critics in considering William James primarily as a psychologist 
rather than a pragmatist philosopher. What interests me here is the ‘chapter 
in descriptive psychology, – hardly anything more’ that James offered in 
essays like ‘On The Function of Cognition’ and in The Principles of 
Psychology, and not his later explicit dispute with properly philosophical 
doctrines, such as rationalism or idealism, and his defence of a 
contradictory view under the headings of pragmatism and radical 
empiricism.6 My focus on cognition does, however, have some bearing on 
the more general question of the relationship between Henry James and 
pragmatism, since the germs of William James’ later philosophical stances 
are present in the views on cognition that he articulated as early as 1885. 
 
In The Principles of Psychology (1890), William James acknowledges 
the puzzle posed to epistemologists and metaphysicians by the fact of 
knowing: ‘Now the relation of knowing is the most mysterious thing in the 
world’.7 As a psychologist, however, he brackets out the mysteries 
pondered in‘Erkenntnisstheorie and metaphysics’, proposing instead to 
differentiate between knowledge and non-noetic mental states (‘subjective 
state[s] pure and simple’) by using ‘the tests we all practically use’.8 This 
solution goes some way towards anticipating the definition of truth later 
elaborated in Pragmatism, in that these tests include the common sense 
expedient of asking, of a given mental state and its real-world referent, 
whether ‘it seems to imply that reality and refer to it by operating upon it 
                                                                                                      
‘Jamesian Pragmatism and Jamesian Realism’, The Henry James Review 18, no. 3 
(1997).  
5 Melba Cuddy-Keane, ‘Narration, Navigation, and Non-Conscious Thought: 
Neuroscientific and Literary Approaches to the Thinking Body’, University of 
Toronto Quarterly 79, no. 2 (2010), Sämi Ludwig, Pragmatist Realism: The 
Cognitive Paradigm in American Realist Texts (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2002), Eliseo Vivas, ‘Henry and William (Two Notes) ’, The Kenyon Review 
5, no. 4 (1943). 
6 William James (1885), ‘On the Function of Cognition’, Mind, 10(37): 28. 
7 William James, The Principles of Psychology, p.216. 
8 Ibid., pp.216–17. James did change his mind about this five years later, as he 
moved towards the philosophical position-taking of Pragmatism. William James, 
‘The Knowing of Things Together’, The Psychological Review 2, no. 2 (1895): 
123–24. 
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through the bodily organs’.9 However, what I would like to emphasise for 
the purpose of this discussion is not only the way in which this definition 
looks forward to pragmatism, but more particularly how defining 
knowledge in this way makes knowing depend on doing: you know 
something if your observable behaviour is consistent with what you are 
supposed to know. This expedient, and its affinities with the doctrines 
expounded in Pragmatism, are more fully developed in the 1885 paper ‘On 
The Function of Cognition’, later collected in The Meaning of Truth: A 
Sequel to ‘Pragmatism’ (1909). In that essay James likewise proposes 
observable behaviour as a simple test for knowledge, again bolstering his 
argument with an appeal to common sense:  
 
And thus do men invariably decide such a question. The 
falling of the dream’s practical consequences into the real 
world, and the extent of the resemblance between the two 
worlds are the criteria they instinctively use. All feeling is for 
the sake of action, all feeling results in action, – to-day no 
argument is needed to prove these truths.10  
 
This appeal to ‘practical consequences’ as a test for knowledge, which 
James formulates elsewhere in the essay as whether or not a mental state 
‘operates on’ a reality, points still more overtly towards his later reduction, 
in the lecture entitled ‘Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth’, of true ideas to 
‘those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify’, where 
‘verification and validation … signify certain practical consequences of the 
verified and validated idea’.11 Mental states dispose one, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, to action, and it is by reference to the 
practical consequences of this belief-driven action that ‘the relation of 
knowing’ is defined.  
 
James explored the implications of this theory for ‘representative 
knowledge’ – knowledge whose object is not present to the senses – in the 
1895 paper ‘The Knowing of Things Together’, also excerpted in The 
Meaning of Truth.12 As in ‘On the Function of Cognition’, knowledge of 
absent objects in the 1895 essay is explained simply as mental ‘pointing’, 
                                                 
9  William James, The Principles of Psychology, p.217. 
10 William James, ‘On the Function of Cognition’, p.36. 
11 Ibid., p.40, William James, Pragmatism: a new name for some old ways of 
thinking; together with Four Related Essays Selected from The Meaning of Truth 
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1949), p.201. 
12  William James, ‘The Knowing of Things Together’, p.109. 
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whose status as knowledge is determined by the behaviour it is apt to give 
rise to. Our knowledge of tigers in India, for example,  
 
is known as our rejection of a jaguar, if that beast were shown 
us as a tiger; as our assent to a genuine tiger if so shown. It is 
known as our ability to utter all sorts of propositions which 
don’t contradict other propositions that are true of the real 
tigers. It is even known, if we take the tigers very seriously, as 
actions of ours which may terminate in directly intuited tigers, 
as they would if we took a voyage to India for the purpose of 
tiger-hunting.13  
 
‘The Knowing of Things Together’ resorts to the commonsense idea of 
‘pointing’ as a way of defining knowledge of absent objects, where the 
accuracy of the pointing is determined by behaviour and its practical 
consequences. James does allow that some of the consequences of knowing 
about tigers may be mental, but his examples seem to incorporate 
behaviour as an essential component of the concept of knowledge: to know 
there are tigers in India means to be able to demonstrate that knowledge in 
a number of ways, including rejecting, assenting, uttering and, at the limit, 
hunting.14 This ‘pointing’ emphatically does not mean any metaphysical 
relation between a knower and a thing known, independent of the 
experiences that such knowledge might lead to: ‘there is no self-
transcendency in our mental images taken by themselves. They are one 
physical fact; the tigers are another; and their pointing to the tigers is a 
perfectly commonplace physical relation, if you once grant a connecting 
world to be there’.15 Hence, when James encapsulates his views on 
cognition in the 1904 essay ‘Does “Consciousness” Exist?’, he proposes to 
dispense with the notion of ‘consciousness’ by focusing on ‘what the 
knowing actually and practically amounts to – leading-towards, namely, 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p.108. Like Ernst Mach and other turn-of-the-century positivists, William 
James believed that all knowledge was ultimately underwritten by sense 
impressions: all knowledge had the potential to ‘terminate’ in some sensory 
perception or other. James, ‘The Knowing of Things Together’, p.106–07. 
For a persuasive correlation of the binary theory of cognition developed in this 
paper and ‘The Beast in the Jungle’, see H. Lewis Ulman, ‘A Possible Lair’, ‘The 
Tigers in India’ and ‘The Beast in the Jungle’. The Henry James Review, 12, no.1 
(1991). 
15  William James, ‘The Knowing of Things Together’, p.108. 
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and terminating-in percepts, through a series of transitional experiences 
which the world supplies’.16 
 
James elaborated the pedagogical ramifications of his psychological 
doctrine himself, first in an 1892 series of public lectures, and then in the 
book Talks to Teachers on Psychology (1899). James’ ambition in this 
volume was to ‘make [teachers] conceive, and, if possible, reproduce 
sympathetically in their imagination, the mental life of their pupil as the 
sort of active unity which he himself feels it to be’, and its fifteen chapters 
largely rehearse the picture of mental life put forward in The Principles of 
Psychology.17 The chapters on ‘Habit’ and ‘Memory’, indeed, reproduce 
James’ magnum opus verbatim, and several other chapter headings are 
carried over directly from the earlier book. Not much attention is given to 
cognition per se in Talks to Teachers, but one can discern the lineaments of 
James’ functional theory of knowledge underlying his insistence on the 
‘The Necessity of Reactions’ – on, in other words, the need for pupils to act 
on their knowledge in order to retain it.  
 
An impression which simply flows in at the pupil’s eyes or 
ears, and in no way modifies his active life, is an impression 
gone to waste. It is physiologically incomplete. It leaves no 
fruits behind it in the way of capacity acquired. Even as mere 
impression, it fails to produce its proper effect upon the 
memory; for, to remain fully among the acquisitions of this 
latter faculty, it must be wrought into the whole cycle of our 
operations. Its motor consequences are what clinch it. Some 
effect due to it in the way of an activity must return to the mind 
in the form of the sensation of having acted, and connect itself 
with the impression. The most durable impressions are those on 
account of which we speak or act, or else are inwardly 
convulsed.18 
 
This kinetic practice of instilling knowledge dovetails precisely with the 
pragmatic theory of knowledge that James had articulated elsewhere. Just 
as knowledge of absent objects – like the tigers in India – is not an absolute 
or metaphysical relation, but is rather contingent on the practical 
                                                 
16 William James (1904), ‘Does “Consciousness” Exist?’, The Journal of 
Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1(18): 486. 
17 William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on some of 
Life’s Ideals (New York: Henry Holt, 1915), p.iv. 
18 Ibid., p.33. 
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consequences of acting on that knowledge – on the ‘series of transitional 
experiences which the world supplies’ – so the knowledge acquired by a 
pupil, in order really to be knowledge, must be allowed to condition the 
pupil’s behaviour. One might indeed say that, for James, the claim that 
‘motor consequences are what clinch it’ applies just as well to knowledge 
in general as to pedagogy. ‘The pointing of our thought to the tigers’, he 
wrote in ‘The Knowing of Things Together’, ‘is known simply and solely 
as a procession of mental associates and motor consequences that follow on 
the thought’.19  
 
On the face of it, William James’ functional approach to the problem 
of knowledge belongs to that side of his sensibility which readers have 
found least sympathetic to the literary imagination of his brother. F.O. 
Mathiesson, for example, identified cognition as the root of their 
intellectual antipathy:  
 
All their other discrepancies in thought and expression would 
seem to stem back to their contrasting conceptions of 
knowledge, since the knower as actor and the knower as 
spectator are bound to behold different worlds, and to shape 
them to different ends.20 
 
This judgement seems intuitively apt when we think of certain touchstones 
of James’ literary theory: most notably, the famous description of the 
‘house of fiction’ in the Preface to The Portrait of a Lady, where the artist 
is described as a ‘pair of eyes’, a ‘watcher’ at the ‘human scene’ rather than 
an actor. The same passage goes on to equate personal identity with an 
accretion of mental states rather than with a history of deeds: ‘Tell me what 
the artist is, and I will tell you of what he has been conscious’.21 And the 
temperamental fissure that Mathiesson finds between the brothers seems to 
widen to a chasm when we turn our attention to the passage from Talks to 
Teachers above, with its cool dismissal of all passive impressions as 
‘waste’. 
 
                                                 
19  William James, ‘The Knowing of Things Together’, p.108. 
20 F.O. Matthiessen, The James Family: Including Selections from the Writings of 
Henry James, Senior, William, Henry, & Alice James (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1947), p.673. 
21 Henry James, The Art of the Novel: Critical Prefaces (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1934), p.46. 
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To be sure, more recent criticism has revised this conception of James 
as the poet laureate of passive spectatorship; phenomenological 
approaches, in particular, have refined the sense in which Jamesian centres 
of consciousness are always already embedded in the world, and are 
responsible for generating their own horizons of understanding.22 In 
phenomenologically informed discussions of What Maisie Knew, Paul B. 
Armstrong and Merle A. Williams both emphasise the active dimension of 
knowing and its inseparability from moral action, and both critics propose 
an affinity between James’ fiction and his brother’s philosophy.23 But 
although Mathiesson’s distinction between the knowing spectator and the 
knowing agent now seems overly clearcut, the poetics of perception still 
tends to loom large in discussions of what and how Maisie knows. In the 
phenomenological tradition, Williams sees the child focaliser as enabling 
James to execute a Husserlian epoché, while a recent reading of the novel 
in the context of fin de siècle urban consumerism posits a ‘metaphoric 
conflation of visual and cognitive experience – what one might call an 
ocular rhetoric of understanding – upon which the narrative turns, and 
which runs through the entire novel’.24 There certainly is an important 
relationship between what Maisie knew and what she saw, and James does 
figure her improper knowledge in terms of vision: ‘She saw more and 
more; she saw too much’.25 However, without wishing to dispute the 
                                                 
22 Paul B. Armstrong’s 1983 study provides the most direct formulation of this 
phenomenological turn: ‘For Husserl, consciousness is not a passive receptacle for 
contents from the outside world but, instead, directs itself actively and even 
creatively toward its objects to posit, constitute, and give meaning to them’. 
Armstrong, The Phenomenology of Henry James, p.7. Sharon Cameron’s 
application of Husserl does not enlist the phenomenological project quite so 
programmatically, but it too argues for a more dynamic picture of consciousness in 
James’ novels than the traditional image of the solitary watcher: ‘In the novels I 
have described, consciousness is not stable, not subjective, not interior, not unitary, 
as James’ Prefaces claim. But it is also, as a consequence, not dismissed or 
deconstructed. Rather, it is disseminated. In the novels consciousness is not in 
persons; it is rather between them’ Sharon Cameron, Thinking in Henry James 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p.77.  
23 Paul B. Armstrong, The Phenomenology of Henry James, pp.37–68, Merle A. 
Williams, Henry James and the Philosophical Novel: Being and Seeing 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.27–48. 
24 ‘Like Husserl himself, she is a perpetual beginner in her perceptual and social 
explorations’.Williams, Henry James and the Philosophical Novel: Being and 
Seeing, p.3; Britzolakis, ‘Technologies of Vision in Henry James’ What Maisie 
Knew’, p.375. 
25 Henry James, What Maisie Knew (London: Penguin, 1985), p.43. 
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importance of vision in the novel, I want to pursue the analogy with 
William James’ functional model of cognition and his advice to teachers in 
order to suggest that doing, rather than seeing, is proposed at crucial 
junctures of the novel as the sine qua non of knowledge and learning alike. 
Seen in this way, an unexpected affinity emerges between William James’ 
stern proscription on wasted impressions and Henry James’ attitude toward 
cognition. 
 
 
Learning in What Maisie Knew 
  
What Maisie Knew signals its concern with pedagogy by offering several 
burlesques of inept, irresponsible, ill-conceived or old-fashioned 
approaches to education. Parts of Maisie’s schooling, for example, 
resemble what William James dismisses in Talks to Teachers as ‘The older 
pedagogic method of learning things by rote, and reciting them parrot-like 
in the schoolroom’.26 Rote learning was passé enough to be dismissed out 
of hand in William’s 1892 lectures, but it features nonetheless in the 
education of Maisie, who recalls, when interrogated about her ‘moral 
sense’, ‘how she sometimes couldn’t repeat on Friday the sentence that had 
been glib on Wednesday, and she dealt all feebly and ruefully with the 
present tough passage’.27 James’ ironic catalogue of the superior 
intellectual attainments of Miss Overmore, ‘who could say lots of dates 
straight off (letting you hold the book yourself), state the position of 
Malabar, play six pieces without notes and, in a sketch, put in beautifully 
the trees and houses and difficult parts’, (WMK 50–51) situates her in the 
same pedagogic paradigm: the daft miscellaneousnesss of this hodgepodge 
underlines not only the emphasis on memorisation, but also the way in 
which knowledge in this reified form is divorced from any practical 
application. Mrs Beale displays the same dizzy inconsequence when 
outlining the ‘subjects’ that Maisie will encounter at public lectures – ‘All 
the most important ones. French literature – and sacred history’ (WMK 
118) – and the lectures that Maisie eventually attends at ‘Glower Street’ (an 
allusion to University College London, on Gower Street) are themselves 
another exhibit in the novel’s sottisier of educational malpractice. Like 
Miss Overmore’s lessons, these lectures are portrayed as comically far 
removed from practical life, with James borrowing an image from Hard 
                                                 
26 William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on some of 
Life’s Ideals, p.34. 
27 Henry James, What Maisie Knew (London: Penguin, 1985), p.260. Subsequent 
references are given in the text. 
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Times to pillory their moral seriousness and earnest futility: ‘the fountain of 
knowledge, in the form usually of a high voice that she took at first to be 
angry, plashed in the stillness of rows of faces thrust out like empty jugs’ 
(WMK 139).28 The glimpses that James gives us of these lectures are 
enough to identify them with the rote learning and the passive reception of 
knowledge criticised by William James in Talks to Teachers. Indeed, if 
knowledge is defined as ideas that stand to be verified by behaviour and by 
its practical consequences, then what is taught Maisie by her governesses 
and at ‘Glower Street’ does not count as knowledge at all. 
 
By contrast, the other, dominant sense of ‘knowledge’ in What Maisie 
Knew – the precocious knowledge that Maisie acquires of moral 
misconduct and the demi-monde – meets William James’ criteria for 
knowledge handsomely, embedded as it is in a rich framework of risks, 
stakes and consequences. Maisie has ample opportunity to test her 
hypotheses in this sphere, and, as we will see, the consequences of error 
can be brutal. As I have suggested, the novel cultivates a comparison 
between these two kinds of knowing and learning, and it sometimes does 
so by showing how they are, for Maisie, confounded. ‘She had not had 
governesses for nothing’, Maisie thinks at Boulogne: ‘what in the world 
had she ever done but learn and learn and learn?’ (WMK 213) From one 
point of view, Maisie mistakes one kind of learning for another here, 
conflating the illicit knowledge that has prompted Mrs Wix’s hand-
wringing with the learning conventionally imparted by governesses. But in 
another sense, she is quite right to merge the two, since the ‘successive 
stages of her knowledge’ (WMK 213) in question in this scene have indeed 
been nurtured by Miss Overmore and Mrs Wix, who are responsible for 
neglecting Maisie’s formal education and diverting her attention onto the 
more immediate mysteries of her entourage. Mrs Wix, who reproaches 
herself at Boulogne with corrupting her charge, actively blurs the line 
between the two kinds of knowing by introducing Sir Claude as a subject 
of schoolroom study: Maisie’s ‘lessons these first days and indeed for long 
after seemed to be all about Sir Claude’ (WMK 76); he seems to hover over 
‘the principal dates and auxiliary verbs’; and teacher and student finally 
abandon Maisie’s lessons in order to ‘draw up to the fire and talk about 
him; and if the truth must be told this edifying interchange constituted for 
the time the little girl’s chief education’ (WMK 80). This invasion of the 
                                                 
28 In the opening scene of that novel, the pupils of Mr Gradgrind’s school are 
figured as ‘little vessels then and there arranged in order, ready to have imperial 
gallons of facts poured into them until they were full to the brim’. Charles Dickens, 
Hard Times (London: Penguin, 1985), p.48. 
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pedagogical by the personal repeats on a larger scale what has already 
occurred with Miss Overmore, who instructs Maisie in the names of her 
own siblings instead of the multiplication tables (WMK 44), and the 
unnamed governess briefly encountered in chapter three, who quizzes 
Maisie about her father rather than her lessons (WMK 46). Thus does the 
novel underscore the negligence of Maisie’s reprehensible guardians and 
the distorted nature of her upbringing, but the same device also brings into 
relation two kinds of knowing: all that Maisie does not learn in the 
classroom, and all that she does come to know about the adult characters on 
whom she is dependent. 
 
Unlike the spurious knowledge that Maisie receives about the 
‘position of Malabar’ or ‘sacred history’, the knowledge she acquires of her 
parents and step-parents meets William James’ criteria of susceptibility to 
verification by ‘practical consequences’. By the same token, it also 
conforms to his lectures on pedagogy by lending itself to practical 
application and testing. Rather than passively receive instruction, James 
insists, students must implement their knowledge in the form of an 
‘expression’, which in turn elicits a response:  
 
We thus receive sensible news of our behavior and its results. 
We hear the words we have spoken, feel our own blow as we 
give it, or read in the bystander’s eyes the success or failure of 
our conduct. Now this return wave of impression pertains to 
the completeness of the whole experience.29 
 
The novel shows us Maisie inferring rules from her own experiences, such 
as the reliability of governesses as opposed to parents (WMK 59), which 
she then tests and, if necessary, revises, as when her ‘researches had 
hitherto indicated that to incur a second parent of the same sex you had 
usually to lose the first’ (WMK 64). The fallibility of her knowledge is also 
repeatedly exposed by the responses of adults to her hypotheses, as when 
she is disabused by Miss Overmore of the supposition that Sir Claude 
might live with her as a tutor, by analogy with a governess (WMK 59). 
Maisie is, indeed, constantly reminded of mysterious lacunae in her 
knowledge by the adult habit of ‘going off’ in response to her utterances 
and questions (WMK 70–71). ‘Everything’, she learns, ‘had something 
behind it: life was like a long, long corridor with rows of closed doors. She 
                                                 
29 William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on some of 
Life’s Ideals, 86–67. 
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had learned that at these doors it was wise not to knock – this seemed to 
produce from within such sounds of derision’ (WMK 54–55). Maisie wants 
to know more in order to avoid the wounding practical consequence of 
‘derision’, with the feelings of confusion, shame and embarrassment it can 
produce.  
 
Just as it is Ida who most makes her regret her direct questions – 
‘Find out for yourself!’ (WMK 55) – so too it is Maisie’s mother who 
inflicts on her the novel’s most lacerating lesson in social behaviour. 
When, at Folkestone, Maisie unhappily breaks her own rule of silent 
‘diplomacy’ (WMK 176) to relay to her horrified mother the Captain’s 
gallant tribute to her ‘goodness’, James again invokes the imagery of 
formal learning to underline the way in which Maisie’s faux pas is related 
to learning and knowing: 
 
Her mother gave her one of the looks that slammed the door in 
her face; never in a career of unsuccessful experiments had 
Maisie had to take such a stare. It reminded her of the way that 
once, at one of the lectures in Glower Street, something in a big 
jar that, amid an array of strange glasses and bad smells, had 
been promised as a beautiful yellow was produced as a 
beautiful black. She had been sorry on that occasion for the 
lecturer, but she was at this moment sorrier for herself. (WMK 
176) 
 
Unable to foresee the many shades of offence potentially contained in her 
statement – not least of which is the mere impropriety, as ever, of her own 
blasé allusions to moral indecency, and the reflection cast by this unwitting 
impropriety on her mother – Maisie is made painfully aware, once again, of 
the fallibility of her knowledge. Whereas the lectures at ‘Glower Street’ are 
divorced from the active lives – the behaviour – of their audience, the 
‘failure of [her] conduct’ in this instance is present to Maisie as a felt 
affective wounding: ‘nothing had ever made for twinges like mamma’s 
manner of saying: “The Captain? What Captain?”’ (WMK 177). Maisie has 
only a distant sympathetic involvement with the ‘experiments’ she 
witnesses, feeling kindly ‘sorry’ for the lecturer, but this vicarious emotion 
can’t compare with the practical consequences of experiments that she 
performs for herself. 
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Knowing how and knowing that 
 
The imagery of this passage invites us to consider Maisie’s ‘experiments’ 
as directed towards the acquisition of knowledge, in a sort of counterpoint 
to the academic knowledge imparted at the ‘Glower Street’ lectures, but at 
the same time it doesn’t seem quite right to ascribe Maisie’s gaffe to 
something she doesn’t know. What she tells Ida is, after all, correct; what 
Maisie lacks is not fact but tact: the tact that would have told her not to risk 
making an indelicate allusion. It will be helpful to borrow a classic 
distinction from analytic philosophy to supplement the vocabulary used so 
far in this essay to describe different kinds of knowing in What Maisie 
Knew. In an influential 1946 essay and then in the second chapter of The 
Concept of Mind (1949), Gilbert Ryle argued that large problems in the 
philosophy of mind stemmed from a failure to understand the relationship 
between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’, and specifically from a 
tendency to make the former kind of knowledge depend upon the latter. 
Ryle’s forceful analysis of ‘mental conduct verbs’, sometimes labelled 
philosophical behaviourism, bears certain affinities to the pragmatic 
attitude to cognition elaborated by William James. To be sure, James, 
unlike Ryle, retained a logical distinction between ‘representative 
knowledge’ as a cause and behaviour as an effect, but on the occasions 
when he refers to the cash value of knowledge – ‘what the knowing 
actually and practically amounts to’ – it seems clear that his definition of 
cognition, in most contexts, is inextricably linked to behaviour. For him, 
drilling down into what it means to know an object will almost always lead 
to talk of actions and practical consequences – as with the rejecting, 
assenting, uttering and hunting we find in the tiger example. Ryle’s 
vocabulary will be useful here in order to clarify how Henry James, too, 
approached cognition as unavoidably bound up with doing.  
 
It is customary to assume, Ryle says,  
 
(1) that Intelligence is a special faculty, the exercises of which 
are those specific internal acts which are called acts of 
thinking, namely, the operations of considering propositions; 
(2) practical activities merit their titles ‘intelligent’, ‘clever’, 
and the rest only because they are accompanied by some such 
internal acts of considering propositions.30 
                                                 
30 Gilbert Ryle, ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, in Collected Papers, Volume 
II: Collected Essays 1929–1968 (London: Hutchinson, 1971), p.212. 
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Ryle argues, however, that this dualistic view of intelligent practices – ‘the 
mythical bifurcation of unwitnessable mental causes and their witnessable 
physical effects’ – is mistaken, and that: 
 
 
Intelligently to do something (whether internally or externally) 
is not to do two things, one ‘in our heads’ and the other perhaps 
in the outside world; it is to do one thing in a certain manner.31  
 
Playing chess, for example, does not involve consulting an inward register 
of the rules of chess and then making moves in accordance with those 
rules. Knowledge-how of this kind refers to a disposition or capacity to act 
in certain ways, and not to the possession of certain pieces of knowledge-
that:  
 
When a person is described by one or other of the intelligence 
epithets such as “shrewd” or “silly”, “prudent” or “imprudent”, 
the description imputes to him not the knowledge, or 
ignorance, of this or that truth, but the ability, or inability, to do 
certain sorts of things.32  
 
Ryle’s analysis of knowledge-how has particular relevance to the 
context of education. Ryle draws largely in The Concept of Mind on his 
experiences in educational institutions and in the military to expound the 
common sense force of his thesis; to show how:  
 
In ordinary life … as well as in the special business of 
teaching, we are much more concerned with people’s 
competences than with their cognitive repertoires, with the 
operations than with the truths that they learn.33  
 
At the same time, however, he believes that education in particular is liable 
to be mistakenly associated with the imparting of such truths: ‘The 
                                                 
31 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson’s University Library, 
1949), p.33, Ryle, ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, p.214. 
32 Ibid., p.28.Accordingly, ‘when we characterize people by mental predicates, we 
are not making untestable inferences to any ghostly processes occurring in streams 
of consciousness which we are debarred from visiting; we are describing the ways 
in which those people conduct parts of their predominantly public behaviour’.Ryle, 
The Concept of Mind, p.50.  
33 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p.28. 
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uneducated public erroneously equates education with the imparting of 
knowing-that’.34  
 
An over-investment in ‘knowing-that’ certainly characterises James’ 
satire of the university extension lectures at ‘Glower Street’, which are 
supposed to conceive knowledge as the contents of a jug rather than a 
disposition to act in certain ways. It is also characteristic of the titbits of 
knowledge that Miss Overmore has memorised – even her playing of the 
piano is presented as a quality rather than an ability, part of a catalogue of 
attributes. By contrast, the knowledge that Maisie desperately tries to glean 
of how to get along in the world without being laughed at or otherwise 
mortified is very much a matter of knowing how. This distinction is 
underlined when Maisie becomes aware of the use being made of her by 
her parents and resolves to suppress, rather than relay, their oblique or 
direct messages to one another. What Maisie suppresses is, of course, 
knowledge-that, whose affinity with the knowledge imparted at ‘Glower 
Street’ is driven home by the duplication of the metaphor:  
 
The evil they had the gift of thinking or pretending to think of 
each other they poured into her little gravely-gazing soul as 
into a boundless receptacle. (WMK 42)  
 
It is in these terms that Beale and Ida judge Maisie’s behaviour as ‘stupid’, 
a failure of the ‘receptacle’ to retain knowledge, failing to recognise that 
Maisie’s behaviour is not a deficiency of knowledge-that but an adroit 
application of knowledge-how. James’ memorable description of how 
Maisie discovers at this moment a Rousseauian ‘inner self’ might lead us to 
construe what happens here as a phenomenon of inward depth, in the realm 
of what Ryle calls ‘unwitnessable mental causes’, but to this interpretation 
we would have to add that Maisie has at the same moment acquired a skill 
or an art: the ‘pacific art of stupidity’, to be exact (WMK 77). Her 
newfound ability not to tell her parents everything has the character of 
‘diplomacy’, which, Maisie discovers to her chagrin at Folkestone, she is 
capable of exercising ineptly as well as adroitly. It does not have the nature 
of a rule or proposition that she can call to mind and obey; indeed, Maisie 
is painfully conscious of her ignorance of any such explicit formula:  
 
The child’s discipline had been bewildering – it had ranged 
freely between the prescription that she was to answer when 
                                                 
34 Gilbert Ryle, ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, p.225. 
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spoken to and the experience of lively penalties on obeying that 
prescription. (WMK 66) 
 
The choice of whether or not to speak is akin, rather, to the non-thetic 
knowhow of ‘tactful manners’, whose ‘canons’, as Ryle puts it, ‘remain 
unpropounded without impediment to the intelligent exercise of those 
gifts’. 35  
 
The fact that Maisie’s parents are represented as engaged in a game 
also suggests that what appears from one point of view as a private 
enlargement of Maisie’s inner life can be read just as well as the 
acquisition of a skill. Games are a pervasive image in the novel, and James 
compares Maisie to a ‘shuttlecock’ here to suggest the ludic and 
competitive nature of this third-party baiting, in which she is a pawn (WMK 
42). A cognate image will occur to Maisie herself later, when she compares 
the struggle of which she is the object to a game of football (WMK 101). At 
one point or another almost all the adult characters accuse one another of 
playing a game rather than acting sincerely, and Ida applies the metaphor to 
her own conduct as she contemplates a coming change in the rules, when 
Maisie will be exploited more as a burden to the other parent than as a 
trophy: this will constitute ‘a sort of game in which a fond mother clearly 
wouldn't show to advantage’ (WMK 46). When Ida and Beale deplore 
Maisie’s ‘stupid’ inability to retain knowledge-that, they ironically fail to 
see that she, too, is playing the game intelligently. 
 
Maisie’s fatal aptitude for bluffing also involves knowledge-how that 
is irreducible to knowledge-that. Maisie seizes every opportunity to exploit 
her guardians’ tendency to take what she knows for granted, as when, 
having inquired about Mrs Wix’s intentions, she quickly assents to Sir 
Claude’s flattering ‘Oh, you know!’:  
 
‘Yes – I know!’ What she knew, what she could know is by 
this time no secret to us: it grew and grew at any rate, the rest 
of that day, in the air of what he took for granted. (WMK 184)  
 
Rather than refuse a compliment to her maturity, Maisie eagerly colludes 
with Sir Claude to preserve a cloak of vagueness over just what she knows, 
while Sir Claude for his part foregoes any ‘attempt to test her knowledge’. 
But at the same time that Maisie misses an opportunity to enlarge her store 
                                                 
35 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p.30. 
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of knowledge-that, she demonstrates an ability to make use of knowledge-
how – a kind of tact – to avoid the disagreeable consequences of seeming 
naive.  
 
Related to this knack for seeming to know more than she does are the 
moments in the text where Maisie makes a precocious-seeming remark 
instinctively, without reflection and even without being able to explain her 
words to herself. This occurs when Sir Claude responds with wry 
amusement to the news of a ‘they’ waiting in Ida’s cab during her visit to 
Mrs Wix: Maisie feels that she has an intuitive grasp of the reason for his 
laughter, but ‘could scarce have told you if it was to deepen or to cover the 
joke that she bethought herself to observe: “Perhaps it was her maid”’ 
(WMK 189). It seems unlikely that Maisie’s intuitive grasp of the joke 
really does get at the sense of Sir Claude’s laughter: the combined chagrin, 
exasperation, incredulity and disgust underlying his response to this further 
news of his wife’s extramarital carryings-on. But what is certain is that this 
kind of explicit understanding is irrelevant to her ability to participate in 
banter, or give the impression of precocity: Maisie is able to catch the tone 
of the conversation and respond aptly without knowing precisely what she 
means.  
 
A similar trick of unreflected utterance occurs during one of Maisie’s 
earnest tête-à-têtes with Mrs Wix in Boulogne, when, before Maisie can 
respond ‘So do I’ to Mrs Wix’s declaration that she ‘adore[s]’ Sir Claude,  
 
something took place that brought other words to her lips; 
nothing more, very possibly, than the closer consciousness in 
her hand of the significance of Mrs Wix’s. Their hands 
remained linked in unutterable sign of their union, and what 
Maisie at last said was simply and serenely: ‘Oh I know!’ 
(WMK 218)  
 
Here again, Maisie instinctively chooses one conversational move over 
another, and would, one suspects, be just as hard pressed as in the previous 
example to explain her reply. Suppressing her first impulse, she opts rather 
for the words that will best give the impression of sharing in this moment 
of ‘unutterable … union’, as well as seizing the opportunity, once again, to 
affect knowingness. 
 
The tension between this kind of social knowledge-how and the 
knowledge-that that characterises Maisie’s formal education comes to a 
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head at the climax of the novel, when Mrs Wix badgers her to produce 
signs of a ‘moral sense’ (WMK 211). ‘For James’, as Tony Tanner notes, 
‘morality is not such an easy business as the edict-mongering Mrs Wix 
makes out’, and her insistence that Maisie ‘condemn’ (WMK 214) the 
liaison between Sir Claude and Mrs Beale is portrayed as simple-minded 
priggery.36 Mrs Wix demands that Maisie demonstrate a knowledge she 
doesn’t possess – the knowledge that for her step-parents to live together 
would be a ‘crime’ (WMK 215) – and Maisie is, as ever, anxious to deflect 
the inquiry and dispel the imputation of ignorance:  
 
Never so much as when confronted had Maisie wanted to 
understand, and all her thought for a minute in the effort to 
come out with something which should be a disproof of her 
simplicity. (WMK 215) 
 
Unable to produce the knowledge of moral transgression that Mrs Wix 
requires, Maisie falls back once again on her knowledge-how: her 
empirically acquired skills in placating and, here, hoodwinking her 
guardians. Following adroitly the cues that Mrs Wix gives her, Maisie hits 
upon an improvisation of jealousy as ‘the way to show she was not simple’, 
declaring her willingness to kill Mrs Beale as a way to ‘guarantee her 
moral sense’ (WMK 217). Sally Shuttleworth describes this action aptly as 
a ‘performative lie’, noting that Maisie ‘has become, indeed, more adept at 
the social intricacies of performance than that dissolute socialite, her 
father’.37 What I want to emphasise here is how this performative know-
how is ironically contrasted, in this scene, with the crude knowledge-that 
on which Mrs Wix’s ethics and pedagogics are based. The interchange 
between pupil and governess, which culminates in Maisie’s inspired ‘Oh I 
know’, seems guided more by an instinctive feel for the right script than by 
a considered understanding of what Mrs Wix is driving at: instead of 
learning the lesson of the moral sense, Maisie deploys a different kind of 
knowledge to feign understanding and appease her inquisitor.  
 
When, in the hotel at Boulogne, Maisie’s ‘moral sense’ is again called 
into question for Mrs Wix, her sense of despair is explicitly compared to 
her experiences in the schoolroom.  
 
                                                 
36 Tony Tanner, The Reign of Wonder: Naivety and Realism in American Literature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge at the University Press, 1965), p.291. 
37 Sally Shuttleworth, The Mind of the Child: Child Development in Literature, 
Science, and Medicine, 1840–1900, p.333. 
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It brought back to the child’s recollection how she sometimes 
couldn’t repeat on Friday the sentence that had been glib on 
Wednesday, and she dealt all feebly and ruefully with the 
present tough passage. Sir Claude and Mrs. Beale stood there 
like visitors at an ‘exam’. She had indeed an instant a whiff 
of the faint flower that Mrs. Wix pretended to have plucked 
and now with such a peremptory hand thrust at her nose. 
Then it left her, and, as if she were sinking with a slip from a 
foothold, her arms made a short jerk. What this jerk 
represented was the spasm within her of something still 
deeper than a moral sense. She looked at her examiner; she 
looked at the visitors; she felt the rising of the tears she had 
kept down at the station. They had nothing – no, distinctly 
nothing – to do with her moral sense. The only thing was the 
old flat shameful schoolroom plea. ‘I don’t know – I don’t 
know’. (WMK 260) 
 
This passage marks the total failure of Mrs Wix’s legislative moralism, 
which is, like the ‘subjects’ she vaguely plans to teach Maisie, utterly 
disconnected from Maisie’s practical, affective life. The novel’s flawed 
pedagogic models are invoked to underline how distant this abstract moral 
code is from ‘practical consequences’, just as James had earlier marked the 
contrast between the bitterly painful lessons Maisie learns from social 
blunders like her mention of the Captain and the impersonal experiments 
she observes at ‘Glower Street’. Here, definitively, the model of cognition 
as a disembodied knowing of propositions, without reference to the 
pragmatist test of practical consequences on the ‘bodily organs’, is found 
wanting.  
 
Crucially, James repudiates such a model of cognition at the level of 
narrative technique, by renouncing the omniscient narrator’s prerogative of 
reducing this experience to an intelligible content. As in the moments of 
Maisie’s virtuoso verbal improvisations, James exuberantly surpasses the 
cognitive model of Mrs Wix’s trite moral lessons, portraying Maisie as a 
far more complex knowing subject than that model allows. Contrasted as it 
is with the trite lessons of the schoolroom and the moral sense, this 
‘moment of grotesque physicality, almost of automatism’ (as Christina 
Britzolakis aptly puts it)38 can be read as a superior fiction of the learning 
                                                 
38 Christina Britzolakis, ‘Technologies of Vision in Henry James’ What Maisie 
Knew’, p.384. 
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body, conforming closely to William James’ prescription for durable 
impressions:  
 
Its motor consequences are what clinch it. Some effect due to it 
in the way of an activity must return to the mind in the form of 
the sensation of having acted, and connect itself with the 
impression. The most durable impressions are those on account 
of which we speak or act, or else are inwardly convulsed.  
 
Maisie’s inward convulsion sets the seal on a durable impression, to be 
added to the other cruelly affective learning experiences that James has 
dramatised. The content of Maisie’s inner life is occluded here, situating 
her crisis on a level of physiological opacity far removed from the 
factitious intelligible truths of the ‘moral sense’. What is clear, however, is 
that Maisie’s effort at introspection has immediate practical consequences 
for her beside which the propositional knowledge sought by Mrs Wix is 
exposed as an intellectualist mirage.  
 
What is put to the test here is, of course, a conative rather than a 
moral awareness: Mrs Wix’s melodramatic catechism forces Maisie to 
cleave publicly to the terms of her ultimatum to Sir Claude. This resolution 
to give up both Mrs Wix and Mrs Beale in order to be with Sir Claude is 
itself a form of knowledge, albeit of a different order than that implied by 
the ‘moral sense’, as James makes plain some pages later: ‘What helped the 
child was that she knew what she wanted. All her learning and learning had 
made her at last learn that’ (WMK 262). Here the quasi-pun on ‘learning’ 
that James has sustained throughout the novel, where that word is used to 
designate both Maisie’s farcical formal education and her hard-won social 
knowledge, recurs to define Maisie’s choice of what she wants as a 
cognitive attainment – a learned ability. In positioning this practical choice 
at the apex of the novel’s narrative arc, James emphatically refuses a model 
of cognition as transparent inward consciousness of knowledge-that. 
However we interpret Maisie’s choice, nowhere in the novel’s final 
chapters does James represent a process of reflective deliberation that 
would allow us to pinpoint the reasons, desires and beliefs that could 
function as putative mental causes for this decision. This crowning 
obscurity, familiar as a marker of the novel’s proto-modernism, entails a 
position-taking on the question of cognition. Maisie’s climactic choice is 
not made to depend on knowledge-that, as it would have if, for instance, 
the ‘moral sense’ had not been exposed as a chimera, and Maisie had 
indeed acted consciously in accordance with a learned moral principle. 
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Rather, the climax of Maisie’s ‘learning’ is a practical knowledge of what 
she wants to do, and the novel’s representation of this knowledge is 
conspicuously devoid of any duplicate mental process shadowing the 
words and actions by which she enacts this knowledge. In this way, the 
novel’s denouement is foreshadowed by those earlier instances of 
unreflective speech in which Maisie demonstrates knowhow in the absence 
of knowledge-that. At the same time, this conative cognition, collapsing the 
distinction between knowing and wanting, is a radical extension of William 
James’ theory of knowledge, making knowledge not only dependent on 
‘practical consequences’ but indivisible from them: no knowledge is of 
more immediate practical consequence than knowing what one wants. 
 
When one thinks of knowledge in Henry James, it’s natural to think 
hermeneutically: of transitions from imperfect understanding to more astute 
readings of the social text. Hypocrisy, imposture and intrigue lurk latent in 
every social situation, and it is the task of the Jamesian protagonist to move 
from myopia to perspicacity in the reading of personal relations. This idea 
of knowledge as something hidden that can be brought to light is 
encapsulated in such affirmations as this, from the Prefaces:  
 
The real represents to my perception the things we cannot 
possibly not know, sooner or later, in one way or another; it 
being but one of the accidents of our hampered state, and one 
of the incidents of their quantity and number, that particular 
instances have not yet come our way.39 
 
It also seems to be implied in the image, from ‘The Art of Fiction’, of 
experience as a ‘spider-web’ which ‘converts the very pulses of the air into 
revelations’, as though the novelist were a kind of bionic ear whose super-
sensitive tympanum relayed knowledge inaudible to the common listener.40 
As it happens, we encounter precisely the same image in What Maisie 
Knew, when Maisie has the impression, at Boulogne, of being on the road 
to omniscience:  
 
She looked at the pink sky with a placid foreboding that she 
soon should have learnt All. They lingered in the flushed air till 
at last it turned to grey and she seemed fairly to receive new 
information from every brush of the breeze. (WMK 213) 
                                                 
39 Henry James, The Art of the Novel, p.31. 
40 Henry James, ‘The Art of Fiction’, in Literary Criticism: Essays on Literature 
American Writers English Writers (New York: Library of America, 1984), p.52. 
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In the thirteen years separating ‘The Art of Fiction’ from What Maisie 
Knew, however, this image of answers blowing in the wind seems to have 
acquired an ironic tint. Maisie’s fascinated sense of sliding inexorably 
towards total knowledge is fanciful, an instance of childish magical 
thinking, and is, moreover, determined by the influence of Mrs Wix: in this 
complex passage, it is quite explicitly Mrs Wix’s melodramatic idea of 
Maisie’s abominable ‘knowledge’ that imprints her imagination. The 
narrator admits, indeed, to encountering a technical difficulty in 
representing Mrs Wix’s attitudes via Maisie’s apprehension here, and there 
is no doubt that the linear, mechanical image of expanding knowledge that 
Maisie intuits and then imitates is originally an image ‘for Mrs Wix’ (WMK 
212).41 In other words, the image of the novelist as hypersensitive 
membrane in ‘The Art of Fiction’ is ironised and relativised in What Maisie 
Knew, becoming another sign of Mrs Wix’s crude and superstitious 
approach to both knowledge and morality. In this novel, James’ only full-
length use of a child protagonist, the hermeneutic model of cognition is 
inadequate, for Maisie does not arrive at the kind of explicit, thetic 
understanding of her situation that so preoccupies Mrs Wix. What is 
required for this portrait of a young learner is an altogether different model 
of cognition, one which accommodates the phenomenon of knowing-how 
without reducing it to an effect of knowing-that. In his careful 
representation of such a model of cognition and such a process of learning, 
James came closer, perhaps, than anywhere else in his fiction to the 
pragmatic theory of knowledge espoused by his brother.  
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41 ‘I so despair of courting her noiseless mental footsteps here that I must crudely 
give you my word for its being from this time forward a picture literally present to 
her’ (WMK 212). 
